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Abstract 
 
The Covid-19 pandemic exposed firms, organisations and their respective supply chains which 
are directly involved in the manufacturing of products that are critical to alleviating the effects 
of the health crisis, collectively referred to as the Crisis-Critical Sector, to unprecedented 
challenges. Firms from other sectors, such as automotive, luxury and home appliances, have 
rushed into the Crisis-Critical Sector in order to support the effort to upscale incumbent 
manufacturing capacities, thereby introducing Intellectual Property (IP) related dynamics and 
challenges. We apply an innovation ecosystem perspective on the Crisis-Critical Sector and 
adopt a novel visual mapping approach to identify IP associated challenges and IP specific 
dynamic developments during and potentially beyond the crisis. In this paper, we add 
methodologically by devising and testing a visual approach to capturing IP related dynamics 
in evolving innovation ecosystems and contribute to literature on IP management in the open 
innovation context by proposing paraground IP as a novel IP type. Finally, we also deduce 
managerial implications for IP management practitioners at both incumbent firms and new 
entrants for navigating innovation ecosystems subject to crisis-induced dynamic shifts. 
 
Keywords:  
Intellectual Property, Innovation Ecosystem, Open Innovation, Covid-19 Pandemic, Visual 
Language  
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1.0 Introduction 
 
The Covid-19 pandemic has dramatically affected the global economy since its outbreak in 
the Hubei province in China in December 2019 (Sohrabi et al., 2020) and during the 
subsequent spread throughout the Western Pacific, Europe, the Americas and the Eastern 
Mediterranean (World Health Organisation, 2020b). Particularly those firms and 
organisations appeared to be under enormous pressure, which are directly involved in the 
research, development and the production of crisis-critical products that are relevant to 
managing the crisis of the Covid-19 pandemic through prevention, diagnosis and treatment, 
such as Personal Protection Equipment (PPE), diagnostic test kits, drugs potentially relevant 
for treating Covid-19 patients, ventilators, vaccines, and so on.1  
 
Not only are incumbent firms in the CC-Sector under particular pressure to provision the 
required capacities for the manufacturing of CC-Products, but also face enormous challenges 
to deal with changes to their ecosystem as suddenly new entrants rush in to support capacity 
 
1 The incumbent firms and organisation are, together with their respective supply chains, henceforth collectively 
denoted as the Crisis-Critical Sector or CC-Sector (Tietze et al., 2020), while products are referred to in the 
remainder of this paper as Crisis-Critical Products or CC-Products (Elsen et al., 2020). 
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building. To succeed, new entrants, incumbents or all of them together have been witnessed 
to be innovative during this pandemic (Tietze et al., 2020). While Intellectual Property (IP) 
often does not feature prominently in discussions related to the current Covid-19 induced 
crisis, various papers indicate that IP has a role to play for ending the pandemic (Azoulay and 
Jones, 2020; Contreras et al., 2020; Tietze et al., 2020). Adopting a visual mapping approach 
in this paper, we attempt to clarify some of the industrial dynamics induced by the pandemic 
and uncover IP associated challenges that affect CC-Sector actors, particularly incumbents CC-
Product manufactures and new entrants, which then helps us to understand how different 
actors can use IP to react to current dynamics and position themselves for a time after the 
pandemic. 
 
When the pandemic struck, on one side, incumbent CC-Sector firms and organisations faced 
a positive demand shock for CC-Products by the exponentially growing number of patients 
(Phua et al., 2020), doctors and hospitals treating them, public health systems, and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), exceeding their inherent manufacturing capacities. On 
the other hand, these firms have to cope with global supply networks that are disrupted by 
heterogenous government responses and national shutdowns caused by measures reducing 
contact rates in general populations (Ferguson et al., 2020; Nicola et al., 2020). For instance, 
India, which is the biggest producer of generics effective in the treatment of milder symptoms 
of Covid-19, such as Paracetamol, experienced a disruption in the supply of necessary active 
pharmaceutical ingredients from China during its industrial shutdown induced by the Covid-
19 pandemic (Oxford Business Group, 2020). 
 
In a recent analysis of research, development and manufacturing upscaling activities during 
the initial phases of the Covid-19 pandemic, Tietze et al. (2020) summarise current dynamics 
in the CC-Sector, which they argue would lead to changes of industrial organisation and 
highlight the importance of IP related challenges. More specifically, they conclude that new 
entrants being called into the CC-Sector to support incumbent firms alleviating manufacturing 
capacity bottlenecks for CC-Products raises questions with regards to the handling of IP 
underlying CC-Products, henceforth denoted as Crisis-Critical IP or CC-IP, that need to be 
addressed sooner rather than later during an unfolding global health crisis in order to avoid 
them becoming hold-ups in the effort to meet the positive demand shock for CC-Products.  
 
In this study, we build on Tietze et al. (2020) and answer to their call for a more detailed 
understanding of IP-related challenges in the CC-Sector during the Covid-19 pandemic. In this 
paper, we visually represent changes in the CC-Sector that take place during the pandemic 
and discuss and visualise those that can be expected after the pandemic. For this exercise, we 
conceptualise the CC-Sector as an innovation ecosystem with incumbents at its centre and 
capture dynamics that emerge when new entrants join incumbents from outside the CC-
Sector to build manufacturing capacity for CC-Products. We further identify potential IP 
associated challenges from the incumbents’ perspective for each phase of the pandemic. In 
so doing, we explore how loci of innovation, as well as IP ownership and usage, can be 
graphically represented in order to visually capture the inherent dynamics in an innovation 
ecosystem and changing IP arrangements specifically. 
 
For visually representing  the  scenarios described by Tietze et al. (2020), we apply and extend 
a visual language for depicting ecosystem dynamics proposed by Moerchel et al. (2021) by 
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introducing visual representations to capture IP arrangements. Furthermore, we model Tietze 
et al.’s (2020) scenario in which industrial manufacturers enter CC-Sector from outside, 
therein considered as Type 1 New Entrants. These are either called in or voluntarily enter the 
CC-Sector to help incumbent firms with increasing manufacturing capacities for CC-Products 
in response to the Covid-19 pandemic crisis situation. These Type 1 New Entrants can be 
classified in four groups: (1) manufacturers with spare valuable resources and capabilities, (2) 
tech giants with diverse capabilities and rich resources, (3) firms with relevant expertise, 
resources and competence, or (4) agile firms with a particular set of skills. Tietze et al. (2020) 
furthermore identify three distinct strategies, which Type 1 New Entrants follow to enter the 
CC-Sector, that is to access the necessary CC-IP typically owned by incumbent firms in the CC-
Sector for the production of CC-Products. These entry strategies include (A) insouciantly 
adapting features of incumbent CC-Products by copying or reverse-engineering without 
conducting freedom-to-operate analysis, (B) designing CC-Products from the ground up using 
own competence and expert advice, thereby potentially developing their own CC-IP, but 
without ensuring proper freedom-to-operate also risking infringement claims, or (C) teaming 
up with incumbent CC-Product manufacturer thereby licensing in CC-IP. Table 1 below 
summarises and aligns the Type 1 New Entrant groups to entry strategies into the CC-Sector 
and provides empirical examples for each.  
 
Table 1: Alignment of Type 1 New Entrant group to entry strategy (synthesised from Ambrosio, 2020; Tietze 
et al., 2020) 
 
Strategy Type 1 New Entrant Group 
Example New 
Entrants 
Example CC-
Product Reference 
(A) Insouciantly 
Adopting 
(4) Agile 
manufacturers 
with particular 
and 
complementary 
skills to the CC-
Sector 
Formula 1 Teams Ventilator (Richards, 2020) 
LVHM, Estee Lauder 
and L’Oréal 
 
 
Hand Sanitizer 
(Pays, 2020) 
BrewDog and Old 
Forth Distillery  
Parkdale Mills Inc PPE (e.g. face 
shields, masks, 
hospital gowns) 
(Ma, 2020) 
Prusa3D, Formlabs 
and Stratasys 
 
(Manero et al., 
2020) 
(B) Designing 
from 
Scratch 
(3) Firms with 
relevant 
expertise, 
resources and 
competence 
Dyson in co-operation 
with The Technology 
Partnership 
Dyson CoVent 
Ventilator (Jack, 2020) 
Roche Roche’s cobas Sars-CoV-2 test 
(F. Hoffmann-La 
Roche AG, 2020) 
 
(C) Teaming Up 
(1) Manufacturers 
with spare 
valuable 
resources and 
capabilities 
(2) Tech giants with 
diverse 
capabilities and 
rich resources 
GM in collaboration 
with Ventec Life 
Systems 
 
 
 
Ventilator 
(Brooks and 
Flores, 2020) 
 
With this paper we first contribute methodologically by extending and adapting a newly 
developed visual approach, namely the Standardised Visual Ecosystem Language, to 
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innovation ecosystem analysis in the crisis use case, thereby expanding the toolbox of IP 
strategy practitioners navigating dynamically evolving innovation ecosystems. Subsequently, 
we apply the adapted and extended standardised visual approach, which results in proposing 
paraground IP as a new type of IP that plays a role in the open innovation paradigm. Finally, 
this paper contributes a set of managerial implications and recommendations for IP 
strategists, practitioners and decision-makers at both incumbent and new entrant firms 
experiencing crisis-induced dynamic shifts in their innovation ecosystem.  
 
The remainder of this paper introduces the research approach including a description of the 
standardised visual language for mapping innovation ecosystems (Chapter 2), summarises 
and discusses the results from mapping the CC-Sector innovation ecosystem for each of the 
three new entrant strategies during the pre-pandemic, pandemic and post-pandemic phases 
(Chapter 3) before closing with a conclusion, listing limitations of this study and 
recommending directions for future work (Chapter 4). 
 
2.0 Research Approach 
 
In order to delineate IP-related challenges, risks and uncertainties in the CC-Sector innovation 
ecosystem during and after the Covid-19 induced crisis, we adopt a qualitative exploratory 
research strategy. We perform an empirically informed, detailed analysis of past and current 
events coupled with a conceptually guided extrapolation into the future of each of the three 
entry strategies empirically identified by Tietze et al. (2020). The three entry strategies (see 
Table 1) for large manufacturing firms called in or voluntarily joining the CC-Sector to help the 
effort of upscaling the production of CC-Products during the crisis are: (A) Insouciantly 
Adopting, (B) Designing from Scratch and (C) Teaming up. Specifically, we apply the  Nominal 
Group Technique (NGT) to: (i) adapt an existing ecosystem mapping procedure and visual 
language, referred to as the Standardised Visual Language (SVEL), to empirically analyse past 
and current events related to the Covid-19 pandemic; and (ii) synthesise future developments 
in the CC-Sector innovation ecosystem for each entry strategy scenario guided by received 
concepts in competitive dynamics. NGT2 represents a structured, direct interaction procedure 
involving a group of subject matter experts (Van De Ven and Delbecq, 1974; Robson and 
McCartan, 2017). The composition of the supporting expert panel is summarised in Table 2, 
along with the areas of expertise and affiliation of each NGT member. 
 
2.1 Nominal Group Technique (NGT) research methodology 
 
The NGT procedure is implemented iteratively in several steps3 (Van De Ven and Delbecq, 
1974). Figure 1 summarises the NGT-based research method described below. Firstly, using 
the previously developed SVEL, the NGT expert panel coordinator prepares maps of the CC-
 
2 The Nominal Group Technique (NGT) is chosen because of its proven capability to achieve more accurate 
judgement about future outcomes in the face of uncertainty, compared to statistically aggregated independent 
judgement, such as questionnaires (Woudenberg, 1991). 
3 We adjust the Nominal Group Technique (NGT) to account for the Covid-19 induced NPIs, such as travel 
restrictions and widespread closures of research facilities. This requires the NGT experts to meet remotely via 
digital means. 
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Sector innovation ecosystem, for each of the three entry strategies described in Table 1, 
during the pre-pandemic, pandemic and post-pandemic phases of the Covid-19 induced crisis.  
 
Table 2: Composition of NGT expert panel, areas of expertise and affiliation 
 
NGT Member Affiliation Areas of Expertise Sector 
NGT Member 1 
(Leader/Coordinator) 
Academic 
and Industry 
x Negotiation of Purchasing and 
Licensing Contracts 
x Innovation and IP Management 
x Manufacturing and 
Management 
x Aerospace MRO 
 
NGT Member 2 Academic 
x Innovation and IP Management 
x Open IP Strategies & IP Pledges 
x Technology Licensing 
x Biotechnology and 
Bioeconomy 
x Economics 
x Manufacturing and 
Management 
 
NGT Member 3 Academic 
x Economics of IP 
x Corporate Strategy 
x Technology and Innovation 
Management 
 
x Economics 
x Manufacturing and 
Management 
NGT Member 4 Academic 
x Open IP Approaches 
x Economics of Patents and Patent 
Transactions 
x Technology Management 
 
x Biotechnology and 
Bioeconomy 
x Manufacturing and 
Management 
NGT Member 5 Academic 
x IP Analytics and IP Intelligence 
x Strategic Decision-making 
x Artificial Intelligence 
 
x Manufacturing and 
Management 
NGT Member 6 Academic 
x Open Approaches to IP 
x Biotechnology and bioeconomic 
policy 
 
x Biotechnology and 
Bioeconomy 
 
Subsequently, the digitally transcribed innovation ecosystem maps are circulated to the NGT 
expert panel for individual review to accurately capture IP dynamics in the CC-Sector 
innovation ecosystem as the Covid-19 crisis progresses from the pre-pandemic through the 
pandemic to the post-pandemic phase. During the collective group review follow-up, the 
coordinator goes through each entry strategy scenario and every NGT member has the 
opportunity to request clarifications, present their feedback and discuss their view. The 
coordinator carefully records the feedback and views of each NGT member and summarises 
them for subsequent circulation to the expert panel with a final request for confirmation. On 
the basis of this consolidated feedback, the coordinator revises the innovation ecosystem 
maps and resubmits them to the NGT expert panel. This procedure is repeated until the NGT 
expert panel is unanimously satisfied that the ecosystem maps accurately represent IP 
dynamics in the CC-Sector innovation ecosystem and group consensus and theoretical 
saturation is reached (Bryman and Bell, 2015; Robson and McCartan, 2017).  
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In order to ensure internal validity of the NGT results, innovation ecosystem maps and expert 
panel feedback is correlated to empirical evidence, namely actual case examples of Type 1 
New Entrants and their respective strategies to enter the CC-Sector, and theoretical concepts 
in the IP management and strategy literature. The following two subsections explain why we 
choose to apply visual ecosystem mapping to capture IP dynamics in the CC-Sector and 
describe the previously developed SVEL used in this process. 
 
 
Figure 1 Overview of NGT-based research methodology 
 
2.2 Innovation Ecosystem and Visual Mapping 
 
We choose to represent the CC-Sector as an innovation ecosystem because it is highly 
appropriate for conceptually capturing dynamic processes involving multiple independent 
actors, artefacts and activities that evolve over time. The concept of the innovation ecosystem 
has developed from Moore’s (1993) analogy between the biological concepts of natural 
ecosystems and co-evolution of species, on one hand, and the organisation of business 
activities across industries and co-evolution of companies’ capabilities around new 
innovations, on the other hand. In a more recent innovation ecosystem conceptualisation, 
Granstrand and Holgersson (2020) established the link between an actor’s innovative 
performance and the evolving set of actors, activities and artefacts surrounding it, as well as 
the institutions and both complementary and substitute relations among them. Viewing the 
CC-Sector as an innovation ecosystem thus provides an effective conceptual basis for the 
identification of actors, the investigation of relationships among these actors, the localisation 
of innovation and hence ownership of resulting CC-IP and the usage of such CC-IP.  
 
Moreover, Auerswald and Dani (2017) conceptually derived the adaptive cycle of economic 
ecosystems following their biological role models established by Holling (1992), in which an 
ecosystem’s inherent ability to absorb strong stochastic shocks and rapid disturbances by 
structural reorganisation is highlighted. Observing the CC-Sector through the innovation 
ecosystem lens thus also allows the observation of how actor roles, relationships and CC-IP 
ownership, as well as its usage, change dynamically as the Covid-19 pandemic unfolds, which 
is considered to represent the agent of disturbance (Holling, 1992) at this juncture.  
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Network visualisations have rarely been used in the context of the management sciences and 
ecosystem research, despite their ability to uncover information in empirical data that was 
previously not apparent (Basole, 2009), thereby offering opportunities for expanding the 
theoretical body of knowledge and gaining valuable insights for practitioners. Examples that 
nevertheless highlight the feasibility and benefits of ecosystem visualisations include Phillips 
and Srai’s (2018) qualitative ecosystem mapping for the purpose of determining boundaries 
in emerging innovation ecosystems and Basole et al.’s (2018) web-based, easy-to-use and 
adaptable tool providing triangulated insight into temporal ecosystem dynamics for 
corporate executives. Furthermore, Urmetzer, Gill and Reed (2018) conducted ecosystem 
value mapping to visualise value creation and capture and to understand a case company’s 
external complexity.  
 
Due to the lack of standardisation in the emerging ecosystem visualisation methods, 
Moerchel et al. (2021) extended Urmetzer, Gill and Reed’s ecosystem value mapping by 
developing a systematic approach to mapping structural elements, structural changes and 
dynamic forces and effects in business and innovation ecosystems, which they call the 
Standardised Visual Ecosystem Language. In this study, we take advantage of the benefits of 
a standardised ecosystem visualisation technique by applying this systematic approach for 
the purpose of understanding the IP-related risks and uncertainties in the CC-Sector during 
and after the Covid-19 pandemic induced crisis. 
 
2.3 Standardised Visual Ecosystem Language 
 
We adopt the novel Standardised Visual Ecosystem Language (SVEL) developed by Moerchel 
et al. (2021) to map the CC-Sector as an innovation ecosystem and capture the IP-related 
challenges, risks and uncertainties as the Covid-19 pandemic unfolds starting from the pre-
pandemic phase through the pandemic to the post-pandemic phase. Based on the work of 
Urmetzer, Gill and Reed (2018), Moerchel et al. (2021) developed the SVEL to address the 
methodological gap of visually capturing and externally representing structural changes and 
their dynamic effects in an evolving ecosystem in a standardised fashion. This novel SVEL 
consists of three clusters of standardised external representations (see Table 3): (i) structural 
elements, (ii) structural changes and (iii) dynamic forces and effect. 
 
2.3.1 Structural Elements  
 
The formulation and representation of structural elements in the ecosystem was informed by 
Adner and Kapoor’s (2010) generic ecosystem framework and to a larger extent by 
Granstrand and Holgersson’s (2020) recent innovation ecosystem conceptualisation, which 
list actors, artefacts, and relationships among them as essential ingredients. These are 
effectively represented by the actor, goods flow and value proposition symbols in the SVEL, 
respectively, whereas colour coding is used to distinguish among actor roles. Particularly 
inspired by Adner and Kapoor (2010), SVEL is designed to focus only on those actors, artefacts 
and relationships that are essential for the formulation and delivery of a value proposition to 
customers, namely the focal firm, suppliers and complementors along with their respective 
products, component inputs and complementing offers. In addition, during SVEL 
development Moerchel et al. (2021) determined that ecosystem actors often occupy dual 
roles, such as the supplier-complementor or customer-complementor combinatorial roles.  
Centre for Technology Management Working Paper Series © A. Moerchel et al. 2020 
 
 9 
2.3.2 Structural Changes  
 
The external representations of ecosystem structural changes was inspired by Auerswald and 
Dani’s (2017) notion of the ecosystem adaptive cycle and particularly the phases of release 
and reorganisation that are typically triggered by some form of ecosystem external 
disturbance. Moerchel et al. (2021) identified that these are best expressed by the evolution 
of actor roles, the diversion of or emergence of alternative goods flows, and the partial 
restriction or even full suspension of goods flows in an ecosystem. 
 
2.3.3 Dynamic Forces and Effects.  
 
These external representations were devised by Moerchel et al. (2021) in order to either 
capture effects on the relationship among actors that result from the ecosystem’s evolution 
or to capture the external forces triggering phase changes in an ecosystem’s adaptive life 
cycle (Auerswald and Dani, 2017). The standardised SVEL representations in the dynamic 
forces and effects cluster contain exertion of leverage or power by one ecosystem actor on 
another, the growth and shrinkage of goods flows, and changes in value capture by one 
ecosystem actor from the relationship with another actor. 
 
3.0 Results and Discussion 
 
In this section we present our results from the iterative NGT procedure, namely the 
empirically informed SVEL extension and adaptation and the CC-Sector innovation ecosystem 
visualisations for each of the three entry strategies during the empirically analysed pre-
pandemic and pandemic phase of the Covid-19 induced crisis, as well as the conceptually 
extrapolated post-pandemic phase. Both the adapted and extended SVEL and the CC-Sector 
innovation ecosystem maps were generated iteratively and concurrently during the NGT 
structured process. The SVEL adoption and extension is presented first and followed by a 
description and discussion of the entry strategy scenarios and respective innovation 
ecosystem maps.  
 
3.1 SVEL Adaptation and Extension for Innovation Ecosystem Visualisation 
 
Moerchel et al. (2021) developed the SVEL for the purposes of visualising structural elements 
in an ecosystem, as well as capturing structural changes and dynamic effects and forces as 
the ecosystem evolves throughout its adaptive cycle. Starting with the first iteration of the 
NGT procedure it became clear, however, that SVEL needed both an extension with new 
external representations and an adaptation of the existing external representations in order 
to address the research goals of this study, namely capturing IP-related dynamics, risks and 
uncertainties in the evolving CC-Sector innovation ecosystem. The following two subsections 
provide further details and include tables showing the adapted and extended external 
representations. We believe that our extensions and adaptations enhance the Moerchel et 
al.’s (2021) methodological contribution in the field of ecosystem visualisation by increasing 
its scope of application, versatility and generalisability
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Table 3: Summary of the SVEL including external representations and nomenclature (Moerchel et al., Forthcoming) 
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3.1.1 SVEL Extension - Mapping IP in ecosystem dynamics 
 
As the primary purpose of this study is to delineate the IP-related challenges, risks and 
uncertainties in the evolving CC-Sector innovation ecosystem, Moerchel et al.’s (2021) SVEL 
needed to be extended by devising additional external representations for (i) the various 
types of CC-IP, (ii) IP ownership and usage, and most importantly (iii)  dynamic development 
of IP during pandemic phase-changes. This CC-IP specific extension is shown in Table 4 and 
described in further detail below: 
 
(i) CC-IP Types. In order to externally represent CC-IP in the innovation ecosystem, first 
and foremost a distinction between two forms of IP is introduced to the SVEL, namely 
formal CC-IP represented as octagons and informal CC-IP depicted as triangles (see 
top section of Table 4). While formal CC-IP is typically registered with governmental 
agencies and therefore public, legally protected and exclusive to the innovator, 
informal CC-IP tends to be unobservable by other actors and protected by alternative 
means (Bonakdar et al., 2017). Examples of formal CC-IP typically comprise patents, 
trademarks, design rights and copyrights, whereas informal CC-IP typically consists of 
trade-secrets, complexity and lead-time (Hall et al., 2014). While Hall et. al (2014) 
uncovered empirically that firms prefer informal IP over formal IP to protect their 
innovations, Holgersson and Granstrand (2017) determined using surveys that 
technology firms seek formal protection, and patents in particular, to protect their 
innovation, prevent competitors’ access and to secure a freedom-to-operate.  
 
(ii) CC-IP Ownership and access: In order to visually capture the spatial developments of 
CC-IP in the innovation ecosystem, namely CC-IP ownership and access, the four edges 
of the ecosystem actor symbol were classified into five sections (as shown in the 
centre section of Table 4). CC-IP that is used by the ecosystem actor, but owned by 
another (3rd party), is located along the bottom edge of its actor symbol, whereas the 
colour-coded frames of the CC-IP symbols indicate whether access to this CC-IP is 
authorised via licensing (green), unauthorised due to lack of licensing (red) or publicly 
accessible due to an expired exclusive right, such as an expired patent (orange). The 
remaining three edges house CC-IP that is owned by the ecosystem actor to which it 
is attached and classified according to the temporal and spatial origin of the 
innovation underlying the respective CC-IP. This approach was a result of the close 
collaboration of the NGT expert panel and inspired by key concepts of IP management 
in open innovation (Granstrand and Holgersson, 2013, 2014). More specifically, the 
left edge of the ecosystem actor symbol houses background CC-IP , which is CC-IP 
developed and existing prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, while the right edge holds 
foreground CC-IP , which is CC-IP jointly developed in collaboration of two ecosystem 
actors and typically owned by and accessible to both actors. Finally, the top edge is 
home to two classifications of CC-IP, namely sideground CC-IP and paraground CC-IP, 
both of which denote CC-IP that is independently developed by the ecosystem actor. 
The major difference between these two CC-IP classifications, however, is that 
sideground CC-IP is developed by an ecosystem actor which has a collaboration 
agreement, such as a license, with another ecosystem actor, thereby ensuring 
authorised access to 3rd party’s background CC-IP, on which the independently 
developed sideground CC-IP is based. Paraground CC-IP, on the other hand, is 
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independently conceived by an ecosystem actor outside of any collaboration and, 
thus, potentially based on unauthorised access to 3rd party background CC-IP 
(background) if freedom-to-operate is not established. In addition, two arrows were 
added, one indicating the provision of access to CC-IP owned by one actor to another, 
and the other to highlight the transformation of CC-IP during pandemic phase 
transitions. 
 
(iii) CC-IP Dynamic Developments: In order to map the dynamic developments of CC-IP in 
the innovation ecosystem as the phases change during the Covid-19 induced crisis, it 
turned out to be highly beneficial to equip each IP symbol on the map with spatial and 
temporal identifiers. The spatial identifier is unique to each IP symbol and helps to 
trace its origin to type of IP owner and collaboration project, whereas the temporal 
identifier counts the phases during which the IP existed, effectively measuring its age. 
The three example spatial identifiers ADP, DES, and COL in Table 4 represent the entry 
strategy in which the respective Type 1 New Entrants conceived the new CC-IP, namely 
(A) Insouciantly Adopting, (B) Designing from Scratch and (C) Teaming up, respectively. 
The three temporal identifiers used are T0, T+1 and T+2 to represent the pre-, during 
and post-pandemic phases during which incumbent firms’ background CC-IP for 
example existed, respectively.  
 
3.1.2 SVEL Adaptations ʹ Proof of its Versatility 
 
The majority of SVEL adaptations consist of customisations of the nomenclature for the 
purposes of the CC-Sector innovation ecosystem. More specifically, the ecosystem structural 
element called “Ecosystem Focal Firm” in the SVEL by Moerchel et al. (2021) is renamed to 
“Incumbent CC-Products Manufacturer” and the “Tangible Goods Flow” is renamed as “CC-
Product”. Thus, we initially adopt the perspective of the incumbent firm in the pre-pandemic 
phase, which is sensible due to the fact that the incumbent effectively acts as the integrator 
of component inputs to the CC-Product and is the owner of the relevant CC-IP during this 
phase. However, as Type 1 New Entrants enter the CC-Sector innovation ecosystem in the 
pandemic phase, our perspective also includes that of the new entrant in addition to the 
incumbent. This effectively leads to the adaptation of the ecosystem structural change 
element called “Actor Role Change” in the SVEL by Moerchel et al. (2021) to the respective 
“Type 1 New Entrant”. Furthermore, other changes to SVEL’s structural elements and 
structural changes were minor and consisted of adding a “Crisis-Critical” or “CC”-prefix in the 
respective nomenclature for suppliers and their component inputs, complementors and their 
complement offers, as well as matching goods flows and goods flow diversions. The 
nomenclature for the external representations of dynamic forces and effects remained 
unchanged. Table 5,6 and 7 below contain the SVEL adaptations devised by the NGT expert 
panel for the purposes of visualising the CC-Sector innovation ecosystem maps. 
 
3.2 Visualisations and Discussion of the CC-Sector Innovation Ecosystem 
 
We examine each of the 3 entry strategies empirically derived by Tietze et al. (2020) namely 
(A) insouciantly adopting, (B) designing from scratch and (C) teaming up, separately for each 
of the 3 pandemic phases, namely pre-pandemic, pandemic and post-pandemic.  
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Table 4: SVEL Extension with IP specific external representations 
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Table 5: Adaptation of SVEL Structural Elements 
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Table 6: Adaptation of SVEL Structural Changes 
 
Table 7: Adaptation of SVEL Dynamic Effects 
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Table 8 supplements these three entry strategies, which were deduced by Tietze et al. (2020) 
and previously aligned to Type 1 New Entrant groups, with empirically identified motives to 
enter the CC-Sector innovation ecosystem and expected behaviour in the post-pandemic 
phase. While the pandemic and post-pandemic phases are different for each of the entry 
strategy scenarios, they all start from the same initial condition in the pre-pandemic phase, 
meaning that the latter is considered only once. Furthermore, the phase changes are 
determined on the basis of the crisis definition by Tietze et al. (2020), which stipulates that 
both a threat to human species needs to exist and risk criticality needs to be elevated by an 
applicable world body 4.  
 
Table 8: Motives to enter CC-Sector and expected behaviour in post-pandemic phase for each alignment 
of entry strategy and Type 1 New Entrant group 
Entry Strategy Type 1 New Entrant group New Entrant motives 
Expected behaviour of 
New Entrant in post-
pandemic phase 
(A) Insouciantly 
Adopting 
(4) Agile 
manufacturers 
with particular 
and 
complementary 
skills to the CC-
Sector 
x Support and give-back to 
local/regional community 
x Support local/regional effort to 
mitigate supply chain bottleneck 
for CC-Products and alleviate 
crisis situation, also known as the 
citizen supply chain (Larrañeta, 
Dominguez-Robles and Lamprou, 
2020) 
 Likely to exit CC-Sector 
after crisis situation is 
terminated 
(B) Designing 
from 
Scratch 
(3) Firms with 
relevant 
expertise, 
resources and 
competence 
x Entrepreneurship: motivated by 
confidence that relevant 
expertise leads to 
substitute/improved/ competitive 
CC-Products 
x For complex CC-Products (e.g. 
ventilator), independent CC-
Product development costs are 
high (Bottomley, 2020) and time 
to achieve satisfactory return-on-
invest may extend beyond the 
termination of the crisis  
 Likely to remain in CC-
Sector after crisis 
situation is terminated 
(C) Teaming Up (1) Manufacturers 
with spare, 
valuable 
resources and 
capabilities 
(2) Tech giants 
with diverse 
capabilities and 
rich resources 
x Utilisation of idle manufacturing 
capacities to cover fixed costs and 
to preserve workforce though 
crisis (López-Gómez et al., 2020) 
x Motivated to recover sunk costs 
in repurposing manufacturing 
 
x Create positive image in the 
public 
 Likely to remain in CC-
Sector until non-CC-
Sector picks up to pre-
pandemic levels 
 
4 Accordingly, the phase change from pre-pandemic to pandemic, or the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic induced 
crisis, is determined by the WHO Director General’s declaration of Covid-19 as a pandemic on 11 March 2020 
(World Health Organisation, 2020c), which followed a dramatic surge in demand for CC-Products worldwide. 
The phase change from pandemic to post-pandemic, or the termination of the Covid-19 pandemic induced crisis, 
will probably be heralded by a continuous drop in demand for CC-Products due to decreasing numbers of 
patients and officially declared by the WHO in a similar fashion as the containment of the SARS outbreak in 2003 
(World Health Organisation, 2003). 
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Before mapping the CC-Sector innovation ecosystem for each of the entry strategy scenarios 
and during each of the pandemic phases, we found it to be useful to synthesise archetypical 
intentions of new entrants to stay in the post-pandemic CC-Sector because it provides 
guidance on strategic behaviour as the Covid-19 induced crisis advances through the 
pandemic into the post-pandemic phase. As shown in Table 8, group 4 Type 1 New Entrants 
insouciantly adopting incumbent firms’ CC-Products form a citizen supply chain (Larrañeta, 
Dominguez-Robles and Lamprou, 2020) with a focus on supporting the local/regional effort 
to alleviate CC-Product supply chain bottlenecks during the crisis situation and are therefore 
likely to exit the CC-Sector after the crisis situation is terminated.  
 
Furthermore, group 3 Type 1 New Entrants designing CC-Products from scratch follow an 
entrepreneurial approach and have a tendency towards staying in the CC-Sector after the 
crisis situation is terminated in order to recover their substantial CC-Product development 
cost (Bottomley, 2020). Finally, group 1 and 2 Type 1 New Entrants teaming up with 
incumbent firms are concerned with retaining utilisation of their idle manufacturing 
capacities by repurposing (López-Gómez et al., 2020) and are hence likely to remain in the 
CC-Sector as long as demand for their non-CC-Products remains below pre-pandemic levels. 
 
In the following subsections, we describe and discuss the CC-Sector innovation ecosystem 
maps that result from applying the adapted and extended SVEL to each of the three Type 1 
New Entrant group to entry strategy alignments during the iterative NGT procedure. We find 
these to be very helpful for deriving an understanding of IP-related risks, uncertainties and 
challenges from both the incumbent firms’ and Type 1 New Entrant group’s perspectives. 
 
3.2.1 Pre-pandemic View of CC-Sector Innovation Ecosystem 
 
Figure 2 depicts the CC-Sector innovation ecosystem using the adapted and extended SVEL 
before the Covid-19 pandemic started to unfold, including the relevant actors, activities, 
artefacts and relations among them in line with Granstrand and Holgersson’s (2020) definition 
of the innovation ecosystem. The Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers (representing a 
group of such firms) are positioned as focal firms at the centre of the CC-Sector innovation 
ecosystem because they are bundling all necessary components into the CC-Products (Adner 
and Kapoor, 2010). The CC-Products, such as PPE, ventilators or drugs (Tietze et al., 2020), 
are, in turn, offered by the Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturer as a customised value 
proposition to diverse customer groups, namely Patients, Publicly Funded Healthcare Systems 
or Private Hospitals and Doctors 5.  
 
During the process of CC-Product development in the pre-pandemic phase, incumbent firms 
endogenously develop innovations and thus intellectual assets covering both product 
specification and manufacturing process information, for which they seek legal protection 
thus building a portfolio of formal and informal IP. More specifically, as part of this CC-Product 
development process, Governmental and Intergovernmental Agencies, such as the Federal 
 
5 While Patients primarily purchase PPE for the individual prevention of contracting the disease (World Health 
Organisation, 2020a) and drugs for the treatment of milder symptoms caused by Covid-19, Publicly Funded 
Healthcare Systems and Private Hospitals and Doctors purchase drugs, ventilators and PPE from Incumbent CC-
Product Manufacturers both to treat Patients in critical condition who require intensive care and to protect their 
staff when diagnosing and treating infected persons with severe symptoms (Phua et al., 2020), respectively. 
Centre for Technology Management Working Paper Series © A. Moerchel et al. 2020 
 
 18 
Drug Administration, grant Certifications and Approvals following clinical trials of CC-Products 
that are common and necessary in the CC-Sector (López-Gómez et al., 2020).  
 
Furthermore, other Government Agencies, such as the European Patent Office, issue formal 
IP rights, such as patents, registered designs and trademarks (Nicholson Price II, Rai and 
Minssen, 2020), thus enabling incumbent firms to exploit their innovations and earning a 
return on their investments in CC-Product related research and development (Contreras et 
al., 2020). When moving on into the pandemic phase, this IP will form the background Crisis-
Critical IP, namely CC-IP (background), that is owned by the Incumbent CC-Product 
Manufacturer since the development of the underlying innovation prior to the start of a 
Covid-19 induced crisis (Tietze et al., 2020). 
 
Furthermore, Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers rely on tangible and intangible 
component inputs from Component Suppliers, Universities or Research Institutes and other 
Manufacturers with CC-Product Relevant Expertise in order to deliver integrated and bundled 
CC-Products and offer customised value propositions to various customer groups. Tangible 
component inputs typically include CC-Product Subassemblies manufactured by Component 
Suppliers, such as air compressors, control valves and electronic control circuitry typically 
found in mechanical ventilators (Chatburn, 1991). Intangible component inputs, on the other 
hand, can entail licenses to use formal and informal CC-IP (background), such as specialised 
manufacturing methods for biologic products previously developed and owned by University 
or Research Institute laboratories (Nicholson Price II, Rai and Minssen, 2020). Furthermore, 
as CC-Product complexity increases, the supplier landscape is likely to become more diverse 
in both component inputs and number of suppliers (Hobday, Davies and Prencipe, 2005). 
 
Another essential concept in the innovation ecosystem paradigm is complementarity both as 
a source of additional value of the focal offering (Adner and Kapoor, 2010) and as the 
counterpart relationship to competition (Granstrand and Holgersson, 2020). In the pre-
pandemic CC-Sector innovation ecosystem this concept is expressed by crisis-critical offerings 
that are supplied by complementors directly to customer groups for downstream bundling 
with incumbent firms’ CC-Products, thus enhancing the combined value proposition. More 
specifically, other Manufacturers with CC-Product Relevant Expertise offer Intensive Care 
Equipment and PPE directly to Private Hospitals and Doctors, which require these 
complementing offers in order to provide Intensive Care and Special Treatment using 
incumbent firms’ CC-Products, such as Ventilators and Covid-19 specific Drugs, effectively and 
safely (World Health Organisation, 2020a). The CC-Sector innovation ecosystem visualisation 
in Figure 2 also shows that the concept of complementarity in the CC-Sector means that some 
actors occupy dual roles, namely either both as supplier and complementor as in the case of 
Manufacturers with CC-Product Relevant Expertise or both as customer and complementor 
as in the case of Private Hospitals or Doctors. 
 
Finally, the pre-pandemic CC-Sector innovation ecosystem shown in Figure 2 is assumed to 
be in an equilibrium state that is historically resilient to small displacements in demand for 
CC-Products. In the context of comparative statics, such an equilibrium state is said to exhibit 
stability of the first kind in the small (Samuelson, 1941).  
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Figure 2: Visualisation of pre-pandemic CC-Sector Innovation Ecosystem 
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The Covid-19 pandemic induced crisis situation, however, manifests itself in a sudden and 
unprecedented surge in demand for the CC-Products (Contreras et al., 2020; Phua et al., 2020) 
representing a stochastic demand shock that forces the CC-Sector innovation ecosystem to 
enter into a release and reorganisation phase of its adaptive lifecycle (Auerswald and Dani, 
2017). This evolution of the CC-Sector innovation ecosystem is further analysed in the 
following subsections which describe and discuss the application of the adapted and 
extended SVEL to visualise the pandemic and post-pandemic phases for each of the three 
entry strategies. 
 
3.2.2 Entry Strategy A ʹ Insouciantly Adopting 
 
Entry strategy A is characterised by Type 1 New Entrants designing and manufacturing a CC-
Product while insouciantly adopting features of incumbent’s CC-Products through copying or 
reverse engineering without clearing IP that might be owned by incumbent firms, such as by 
conducting a freedom-to-operate analysis (Tietze et al., 2020). Type 1 New Entrants following 
this strategy typically are agile manufacturers with particular and complementary skills to the 
CC-Sector, which are herein denoted as group 4 Type 1 New Entrants 6. By not conducting due 
diligence and thereby accepting the risk of infringing formal CC-IP (background) that is owned 
by the Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturer, these Type 1 New Entrants may face 
infringement claims by the incumbent or  injunctions against their CC-Product, even though 
incumbents might not exercise their rights due to potential reputational damages during the 
pandemic or because they are simply busy with scaling up production  (Tietze et al., 2020).  
 
As shown in Figure 3 visualising entry strategy A in the pandemic CC-Sector innovation 
ecosystem, Type 1 New Entrants from group 4 tend to only adopt essential features of 
incumbent firms’ CC-Product due to their relative small size and limited resources (Tietze et 
al., 2020), nevertheless meeting minimally clinically acceptable specifications (López-Gómez 
et al., 2020). This minimal viable CC-Product is then offered to Patients, as well as Private 
Hospitals and Doctors, concurrently to the original CC-Product by incumbent manufacturers 
in order to alleviate the surge in demand during the pandemic phase of the crisis on a local or 
regional scale (Manero et al., 2020). 
 
During the process of developing and manufacturing a minimal viable CC-Product, Type 1 New 
Entrants from group 4 typically focus on essential functionalities, thus omitting more 
advanced features of incumbent’s CC-Products. More specifically, the urgency and volume of 
demand dictated by the Covid-19 pandemic induced crisis (Contreras et al., 2020; Phua et al., 
2020) coupled with endogenous limitations in manufacturing resources and capabilities 
(Manero et al., 2020; Tietze et al., 2020) require firms in this Type 1 New Entrant group to 
realise substantial lead-time and cost reductions and to focus on an optimised performance 
 
6 Examples are Formula 1 teams joining forces to launch Project Pitlane and reverse-engineering and rapidly 
manufacturing a continuous positive airway pressure device (Richards, 2020), luxury brand manufacturers, such 
as LVMH, L’Oreal and Estee Lauder, switching their production facilities to making hand sanitisers (Pays, 2020), 
cloth manufacturers, such as Parkdale Mills, repurposing production lines to making PPE (Ma, 2020), and 3D 
printer manufacturers, such as Prusa3D, Formlabs and Stratasys, enabling their widely distributed customer base 
to produce standardised and validated PPE designs for their respective communities (Manero et al., 2020). 
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level for the local and regional customer groups 7. Group 4 Type 1 New Entrants essentially 
satisfy the criteria for conducting frugal innovation (Weyrauch and Herstatt, 2017), thereby 
introducing micro level technological discontinuities (Garcia and Calantone, 2002) that are 
likely to be new to incumbent firms. These frugal innovations materialise as newly developed 
informal CC-IP that is based on both group 4 firms’ complementary background IP and 
incumbent firms’ CC-IP (background). As exemplified by the coalition of 3D printer 
manufacturers (Larrañeta, Dominguez-Robles and Lamprou, 2020; Manero et al., 2020), this 
newly developed informal CC-IP could relate to the use of substitute materials that are 
available to group 4 firms from their existing suppliers, thus realising lead-time and cost-
reductions, and are necessary in order to manufacture the minimal viable CC-Products with 
equipment and process technology available to them.   
 
As this novel informal CC-IP is developed by group 4 Type 1 New Entrants neither in 
collaboration with the Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers nor on the basis of authorised 
access to the incumbent firms’ CC-IP (background), it does not qualify as foreground or 
sideground IP (Granstrand and Holgersson, 2014). It is thus herein newly defined as 
paraground CC-IP. While group 4 firms typically fail to conduct a freedom-to-operate analysis 
prior to insouciantly adopting features in its minimal viable CC-Product, to which incumbent 
firms have an exclusive right through formal ownership of CC-IP (background), the Incumbent 
CC-Product Manufacturer tends to avoid legal action against group 4 Type 1 New Entrants 
during the pandemic because of potential reputational damage (Tietze et al., 2020) and due 
to demand for CC-Products anyway exceeding the incumbent firms’ production capacities 
(Ambrosio, 2020). Nevertheless, this novel CC-IP (paraground) developed by group 4 firms 
following this entry strategy is potentially still of interest to incumbent firms. After the Covid-
19 pandemic terminates and the demand for CC-Products decreases towards pre-pandemic 
levels and below incumbent firms’ production capacity, as shown in Figure 4, the Incumbent 
CC-Product Manufacturer may however choose to respond to group 4 Type 1 New Entrants, 
for example, by filing infringement claims against them for unauthorised usage of its formal 
CC-IP (background) 8, to which the latter gained access through copying and reverse 
engineering (Tietze et al., 2020). Without having conducted a freedom-to-operate analysis 
prior to entering the CC-Sector with its minimal viable CC-Product, group 4 Type 1 New 
Entrants now face the risk of having to compensate the incumbent for lost profits or at least 
a reasonable royalty (Poltorak and Lerner, 2011, p. 120). Furthermore, infringement claims 
by incumbent firms could also aim for an injunction against the group 4 Type 1 New Entrant 
barring any further infringement (Poltorak and Lerner, 2011, p. 123), thus fully suspending 
the supply of minimal viable CC-Products to Patients and Hospitals or Doctors. This post-
pandemic scenario and the IP-related dynamics are captured in Figure 4. 
 
7 For instance, Manero et al. (2020) reported that a coalition of 3D printer manufacturers in the U.S. along with 
their international customer base succeeded in optimising face shield visor designs for distributed additive 
manufacturing using 3D printers. Designs applicable for 3D printing typically consist of adapted shapes and raw 
material specifications that realise short manufacturing lead-times and material waste reduction (Larrañeta, 
Dominguez-Robles and Lamprou, 2020). Despite inferior material properties, such as higher porosity, and higher 
variability in the production process, 3D printed visors manufactured by the coalition were cleared for use under 
the Federal Drug Administration’s Emergency Use Authorization in the U.S. (Manero et al., 2020). 
8 A precedent was set by Allele Pharmaceuticals Inc., who sued Regeneron in White Plains, New York, and filed 
complaints against Pfizer Inc. and BioNTech SE in a federal court in San Diego, California, for applying its 
patented fluorescent protein called mNeonGreen while developing treatments of Covid-19 without a license 
(Yasiejko, 2020). 
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Figure 3: Visualisation of pandemic CC-Sector innovation ecosystem with group ϰ Type 1 New Entrants insouciantly adopting incumbent firms’ CC-product 
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Ultimately, Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers need to decide whether the anticipated 
commercial benefit of compensation and injunction exceeds the cost of litigation (Poltorak 
and Lerner, 2011, p. 113f), which may not necessarily be the case with group 4 firms, namely 
Agile Manufacturers with Particular Skills due to their small scale operation (Tietze et al., 
2020). In addition, the incumbent may contemplate the strategic relevance of gaining access 
to the newly developed informal CC-IP (paraground) developed by group 4 Type 1 New 
Entrants during the pandemic phase.  
 
As determined above, group 4 firms’ informal CC-IP (paraground) could effectively represent 
frugal innovation bearing the potential for minimised resource requirements and cost 
reductions while still satisfying quality and performance (Tiwari and Herstatt, 2012). These 
characteristics may become relevant features of the CC-Product value chain in the ‘new 
normal’ of the post-pandemic phase due to an emerging general consensus on voluntary 
simplicity and affordability (Herstatt and Tiwari, 2020).  
 
Thus, when deciding how to respond to the competitive threat posed by group 4 Type 1 New 
Entrants in the post-pandemic phase, Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers need to reflect 
whether either the prospect of damage compensation by the infringing new entrant or the 
potential value of the frugal innovation captured in its CC-IP (paraground) outweigh the costs 
of litigation. 
 
Group 4 Type 1 New Entrants, on the other hand, also face a strategic decision as the Covid-
19 pandemic comes to an end and the CC-Sector transitions into the post-pandemic phase, 
namely whether to cease from the manufacturing of CC-Products or to continue, thus 
remaining in the CC-Sector. In the latter case, it would be prudent for the group 4 Type 1 New 
Entrants to negotiate licenses with the Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturer, thereby finally 
ensuring authorised access to its CC-IP (background). Offering the incumbent cross-licensing 
of its own CC-IP (paraground) may be a sensible approach by group 4 Type 1 New Entrants to 
build leverage, but incumbent firms would probably be inclined to pursue litigation in order 
to force the group 4 firms out from the contracting CC-Sector and nevertheless seek access 
to CC-IP (paraground) as part of the sought compensation.  
 
In essence, considering the small scale of group 4 Type 1 New Entrants and their local to 
regional focus, it would be more realistic for these firms in this scenario to proactively cease 
manufacturing of CC-Products and follow and inside-out open innovation approach 
(Chesbrough, 2012) by out-licensing its CC-IP (paraground) to other actors in the CC-Sector, 
including incumbent firms. This strategic path avoids any IP infringement claims and 
potentially allows monetisation of its false-negative IP (Chesbrough, 2012). 
 
3.2.3 Entry Strategy B ʹ Designing from Scratch 
 
When following entry strategy B, Type 1 New Entrants use their inherent technical 
competence and, if necessary, outside expert advice to design a CC-Product from scratch 
(Tietze et al., 2020) with the goal to match the value proposition of incumbent firms’ CC-
Products.  
 
 
Centre for Technology Management Working Paper Series © A. Moerchel et al. 2020 
 
 24 
 
Figure 4: Visualisation of post-pandemic CC-Sector innovation ecosystem with Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers filing an infringement claim against group 4 
Type 1 New Entrant
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These manufacturing firms entering the CC-Sector by newly developing CC-Products are 
herein denoted as group 3 Type 1 New Entrants9. Dictated by the dynamic upsurge in demand 
for CC-Products at the start of the pandemic, group 3 Type 1 New Entrants following entry 
strategy B may not have sufficient time to conduct thorough freedom-to-operate analyses, 
thus potentially infringing CC-IP (background) owned by Incumbent CC-Product 
Manufacturers (Tietze et al., 2020) in a similar fashion as in the entry strategy A scenario. 
Group 3 Type 1 New Entrants choosing entry strategy B typically realise that they possess 
capabilities and resources to potentially design, develop and produce a substitute CC-Product 
with enhanced features that is equivalent to the incumbent firms’ CC-Product, thereby 
representing an additional source during the pandemic phase when CC-Product demand 
substantially exceeds incumbent firms’ manufacturing capacities.  
 
Furthermore, being larger firms, Type 1 New Entrants of group 3 typically own formal and 
informal background IP that may be complementary, but new to the CC-Sector allowing them 
to introduce macro-level technological discontinuities to the sector (Garcia and Calantone, 
2002). For example, Group 3 Type 1 New Entrants essentially have expertise and 
competences captured in complementary background IP to design and develop enhanced CC-
Products from scratch10, as well as the resources and scale to offer it to all customer groups 
in the CC-Sector innovation ecosystem, namely Patients, Publicly Funded Healthcare Systems 
and Private Hospitals or Doctors, on a national level, whose demand cannot be met by 
incumbent firms. Figure 5 below depicts group 3 Type 1 New Entrants designing CC-Products 
from scratch and introducing enhancements to the CC-Sector that are based on their 
complementary formal and informal background IP from outside the CC-Sector. 
 
As group 3 Type 1 New Entrants design and develop CC-Products from scratch, thereby 
applying their complementary background IP to applications in the CC-Sector, as well as 
deviating from existing CC-Product designs in order to accommodate their existing 
manufacturing processes and equipment and supplier network, they potentially come up with 
innovative solutions to solve design problems or manufacturing challenges11. This does not 
only potentially lead to a CC-Product enhancement as discussed above, but also essentially 
represents novel CC-IP (Tietze et al., 2020). The development of this novel CC-IP, however, 
 
9 Dyson, which designed and built the CoVent ventilator (Jack, 2020), and Roche, which developed the Sars-CoV-
Ϯ testing kit extending its cobas ϲϴ00/ϴϴ00 systems’ capabilities to become Covid-19 relevant (F. Hoffmann-La 
Roche AG, 2020), are both examples for this new entrant group following entry strategy B. Dyson relied on its 
expertise with managing air flows, robotics, electronics and software (The James Dyson Foundation, 2020), as 
well as the expert advice from The Technology Partnership (Jack, 2020), to rapidly design and manufacture a 
fully functional ventilator ready for regulatory approval. Roche used its experience with developing rapid clinical 
diagnostics equipment to develop a PT/PCR test specifically for diagnosing Sars-CoV-2. 
10 Dyson has accumulated a considerable amount of expertise related to the efficient management of internal 
air flow in devices captured in both formal and informal IP (4iP Council, 2016; Justia, 2020). This complementary 
background IP enabled Dyson to develop a ventilator design, namely CoVent, which potentially surpasses the 
efficiency and performance of incumbent ventilator designs. Furthermore, Roche’s knowledge base with rapid 
diagnostics equipment meant that it possessed complementary background IP on which basis it was able to 
develop a rapid Sars-CoV-2 testing solution for clinical use in the CC-Sector. With a capacity exceeding 4,000 test 
results in 24 hours (F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG, 2020), Roche’s enhanced testing equipment for Sars-CoV-2 
potentially beats the testing capabilities of Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers and service providers. 
11 Returning to the Dyson CoVent example, the design team consciously decided to avoid traditional ventilator 
components in order to avoid supply chain bottlenecks that were encountered by incumbent firms (Bottomley, 
2020). 
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comes at a cost as shown by the Dyson CoVent example, which reportedly required an 
investment of 20 million pounds (Bottomley, 2020). The magnitude of such investment 
combined with economic pressures during the crisis and entrepreneurial spirit dictate that 
group 3 Type 1 New Entrants seek options to realise a return on their investment (4iP Council, 
2016). Next to seeking expedited regulatory approval of their enhanced CC-Products, which 
is typically a stringent requirement in the CC-Sector (López-Gómez et al., 2020), it would be 
prudent for group 3 firms to also apply for formal protection of their newly developed CC-IP 
by registering patents, designs or trademarks at the applicable Government / 
Intergovernmental Agencies (Tietze et al., 2020). 
 
Similarly to the novel informal CC-IP developed by group 4 Type 1 New Entrants in the entry 
strategy A scenario, the formal and informal CC-IP devised by group 3 firms in this scenario 
does also not qualify as either foreground or sideground IP due to the absence of any 
collaboration between new entrants and incumbents and the omission of any freedom-to-
operate analysis by the new entrants (Granstrand and Holgersson, 2014).  
 
As shown in Figure 5, we apply the new definition of CC-IP (paraground) here again to capture 
the innovation behind CC-Product enhancements introduced by group 3 Type 1 New Entrants. 
The pandemic CC-Sector innovation ecosystem map also captures the possibility that group 3 
firms rely on tangible and intangible component inputs, such as Subassemblies from 
Suppliers, if dictated by the inherent complexity of the Enhanced CC-Product (Hobday, Davies 
and Prencipe, 2005). In this scenario, Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers do not merely 
have to cope with a limited matching copy of their CC-Products in regionally limited markets 
as in the entry strategy A scenario but face the potent risk of a new entrant effectively 
becoming a potent competitor with an innovatively enhanced CC-Product, thus remaining in 
the CC-Sector permanently (Tietze et al., 2020) 
 
Discussed from the entry strategy A scenario, it is unlikely and of little value to Incumbent CC-
Product Manufacturers to respond to group 3 Type 1 New Entrants pursuing entry strategy B 
during the pandemic phase due to potential reputational backlash, such as being viewed as 
overly exploitative during times of crisis, and because the crisis-dependent upsurge in 
demand for CC-Products overwhelms incumbent firms’ production capacities (Tietze et al., 
2020). However, when the pandemic phase terminates and demand for CC-Products declines,  
incumbent firms may need to react to the then appearing competitive threat posed by group 
3 Type 1 New Entrants in order to at least conserve their pre-pandemic market share and 
sales figures for CC-Products in the face of a contracting CC-Sector.  
 
In this paper, we consider two extreme perspectives of competitive dynamics (Chen and 
Miller, 2015), namely the rivalrous view manifested in a defensive counter strategy on one 
side and the relational view represented by an open innovation strategy on the other side, to 
visualise how IP dynamics change in the CC-Sector innovation ecosystem after the Covid-19 
pandemic terminates and group 3 Type 1 New Entrants decide to remain in the CC-Sector. 
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Figure 5: Visualisation of pandemic CC-Sector innovation ecosystem with group 3 Type 1 New Entrants designing CC-Products from scratch
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3.2.3.1 Post-pandemic response option (1) - Rivalrous Perspective: IncƵmbenƚƐ͛ 
Defensive Counter Strategy 
 
Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers with a rivalrous perspective on competitive dynamics 
would exhibit a tendency towards short-term economically targeted tactics (Chen and Miller, 
2015). As shown in our visualisation of the post-pandemic CC-Sector innovation ecosystem in 
Figure 6, these incumbent firms would directly attack group 3 Type 1 New Entrants for using 
their CC-IP (background) without authorisation by filing an infringement claim and seeking an 
injunction against Enhanced CC-Products as well as damage compensation, thus stimulating 
IP-related dynamics in the innovation ecosystem.  
 
As stated previously, group 3 Type 1 New Entrants would typically not have conducted a 
freedom-to-operate analysis while designing their Enhanced CC-Products from scratch due to 
the urgency of meeting the positive demand shock at the start of the pandemic phase (Tietze 
et al., 2020), which means that the likelihood of incumbents’ infringement claims being 
successful is high. If indeed successful, group 3 Type 1 New Entrants face the prospect of 
having to stop selling its Enhanced CC-Products to any customer group, compensating the 
claiming Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturer for lost profits or at least a reasonable royalty, 
and losing any formal CC-IP (paraground), particularly patents due to the incumbents’ CC-IP 
(background) effectively representing prior art (Poltorak and Lerner, 2011). Here, the legal 
concept of doctrine of equivalents may become particularly relevant because it stipulates that 
an infringement has occurred if the Enhanced CC-Product designed from scratch performs the 
same function, in the same way, with similar results as the incumbents’ CC-Product (Poltorak 
and Lerner, 2011, p. 108). 
 
Discussed from the entry strategy A scenario, Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers need to 
balance the risk of high litigation costs versus the potential economic benefit of damage 
compensation and injunction (Poltorak and Lerner, 2011, p. 113). Contrary to Agile 
Manufacturers with Particular Skills in the entry strategy A scenario, group 3 Type 1 New 
Entrants following entry strategy B have the resources to manufacture enhanced CC-Products 
on a larger scale meaning that pursuing litigation may be an economically viable solution for 
incumbents due to damage compensation scaling with Enhanced CC-Product sales by group 
3 firms (Poltorak and Lerner, 2011, p. 119).  
 
However, there is more to consider for Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers: access to the 
potentially valuable CC-IP (paraground) and complementary background IP underlying CC-
Product enhancements introduced by group 3 Type 1 New Entrants. More specifically, 
incumbents’ defensive counter strategy may prevent them from accessing background 
knowledge necessary to implement CC-Product enhancements developed by group 3 firms 
because the latter are unlikely to offer incumbent firms authorised access to its 
complementary background IP and remaining informal CC-IP (paraground) after being 
prosecuted by them. Essentially, following a defensive counter strategy has the potential to 
lead to short-term economic benefits for Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers, but is 
unlikely to enable them to access the IP underlying CC-Product enhancements introduced by 
group 3 Type 1 New Entrants during the pandemic phase. 
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Figure 6: Visualisation of post-pandemic CC-Sector innovation ecosystem with Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers pursuing a defensive counter strategy against 
group 3 firms 
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Group 3 Type 1 New Entrants face considerable economic risk when confronted by Incumbent 
CC-Product Manufacturers pursuing a defensive counter strategy. As stated above, the 
financial repercussions are likely to entail the costs of litigation, compensation of the 
incumbent for lost profits or a reasonable royalty and the potentially high development costs 
sunk in designing the Enhanced CC-Product from scratch due to an injunction. The group 3 
Type 1 New Entrants should therefore prudently conduct a freedom-to-operate analysis as 
early as practicably reasonable during the crisis (Tietze et al., 2020) in order to identify 
features of its Enhanced CC-Products and relevant formal CC-IP (paraground) potentially 
infringing incumbents’ formal CC-IP (background)12. Ultimately, this would allow group 3 firms 
following entry strategy B to take corrective action if necessary and to design around 
incumbents’ CC-IP (background), thereby proactively avoiding an infringement claim and 
litigation, as well as conserving its potential to market and sell its Enhanced CC-Product. 
 
3.2.3.2 Post-pandemic response option (2) - Relational Perspective: IncƵmbenƚƐ͛ OƉen 
Innovation Strategy 
 
Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers with a relational perspective on competitive dynamics 
would focus on long-term success and appreciate that this can only be achieved if needs, 
preferences and interdependencies of other stakeholders in an innovation ecosystem are 
taken into account (Chen and Miller, 2015). In the context of the post-pandemic CC-Sector, 
incumbents with a relational perspective appreciate the value of macro-level technological 
discontinuities brought into the CC-Sector by group 3 Type 1 New Entrants and accept that 
access to innovations captured in CC-IP (paraground) could benefit themselves as well as the 
various customer groups by improving the CC-Product’s value proposition. As depicted in our 
visualisation of the post-pandemic CC-Sector innovation ecosystem in Figure 7, incumbents 
with a relational perspective would be more inclined towards pursuing a collaborative, that 
is open innovation, approach with group 3 firms, instead of pursuing an infringement claim 
and compensation for lost profits or royalties.  
 
More specifically, Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers could proactively and restrictively 
(for the duration of the pandemic) license its formal CC-IP (background) to group 3 Type 1 
New Entrants, thereby granting them authorised access and a limited freedom-to-operate 
under the terms and conditions of a license. In trade for that, group 3 Type 1 New Entrants 
would cross-license its formal CC-IP (paraground) to Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers, 
thereby granting reciprocal authorised access under certain terms and conditions of a license. 
Here, Figure 7 highlights unfolding IP-related dynamics induced by the reciprocal cross-
licensing between the actors, namely both the complementary background IP which group 3 
firms already owned prior to the pandemic and the CC-IP (paraground) which it developed 
during the pandemic phase now becoming its cumulative portfolio of background CC-IP.  
 
Typical license restrictions limiting the usage of IP are captured in change-of-technology, 
change-of-control, no-challenge and termination clauses (Granstrand and Holgersson, 2014), 
as well as scope-restriction clauses limiting the scope of usage of licensed IP to certain 
 
12 Dyson’s group IP director, Gill Smith, stated that the company takes formal IP and patents in particular 
seriously, and expects other companies to respect its IP portfolio in the same way it honours IP ownership of 
others (4iP Council, 2016). From this statement, it is reasonable to assume that Dyson has internal IP processes 
in place enabling it to ensure proper freedom-to-operate prior to bringing the CoVent ventilator to market. 
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markets, products and customer groups. How each of these clauses are formulated and how 
the added value of the CC-Product enhancement is shared between the Incumbent CC-
Product Manufacturers and group 3 Type 1 New Entrants is subject to IP contracting and 
licensing negotiations between the actors. Ahead of these negotiations, it is worthwhile for 
incumbent firms to remember that they can create leverage over new entrants by 
emphasising the alternative option of switching to a defensive counter strategy as previously 
described if a cross-licensing agreement under agreeable terms and conditions cannot be 
reached. 
 
When negotiating cross-licensing agreements, Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers could 
use their bargaining power, which results from the alternative option to switch to a defensive 
counter strategy, to assert scope-restriction clauses that limit group ϯ Type 1 New Entrants’ 
usage of its CC-IP (background). For instance, this could limit the range of customer groups to 
which group 3 firms may sell Enhanced CC-Products or preclude them from independently 
developing any further CC-Product enhancements thereby effectively prohibiting the 
generation of novel CC-IP (sideground). While it would be sensible for Incumbent CC-Product 
Manufacturers to limit group ϯ Type 1 New Entrants’ access to customer groups, thereby 
effectively controlling their market share in the post-pandemic CC-Sector, it could potentially 
be beneficial not to overly restrict group ϯ firms’ usage of its CC-IP (background) for the 
development of further CC-Product enhancements in order to conserve the innovativeness 
of the collaboration. Instead, Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers should use their 
bargaining power to assert more advantageous change-of-technology terms and conditions. 
For example, incumbents could insist on assign-back clauses, which force group 3 Type 1 New 
Entrants to transfer ownership of novel CC-IP (sideground) underlying further CC-Product 
enhancements during the post-pandemic phase to Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers 
(Granstrand and Holgersson, 2014). Equipped with a strong negotiation mandate, Incumbent 
CC-Product Manufacturers can dictate favourable cross-licensing terms and conditions, 
whereas caution should be practiced by incumbent firms not to stifle the innovativeness of 
the collaboration by asserting clauses disincentivising any further CC-Product enhancements 
by group 3 Type 1 New Entrants.  
 
Group 3 Type 1 New Entrants, on the other hand, may need to compromise heavily in the face 
of incumbents’ bargaining power and to avoid the economic risk that may result from their 
defensive counter strategy. Considering incumbent firms’ focus on scope-restriction and 
change-of-technology terms and conditions in cross-licensing negotiations as discussed 
above, group 3 firms may need to compromise between access to customer groups in the CC-
Sector innovation ecosystem and ownership of novel CC-IP (sideground) underlying CC-
Product enhancements that it introduces during the post-pandemic phase. If group 3 Type 1 
New Entrants decide that access to a wide range of customer groups represents a more 
promising path to achieving their return on investment objectives, they could accept any 
assign-back clauses required by Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers, thereby trading 
ownership of all novel CC-IP (sideground) underlying future CC-Product improvements in for 
access to a wider scope of customer groups. Otherwise, group 3 firms would be advised to 
trade access to customer groups in the CC-Sector innovation ecosystem in for replacing any 
assign-back clauses with grant-back clauses, retaining ownership of all novel CC-IP 
(sideground), but having to license it to Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers (Granstrand 
and Holgersson, 2014).  
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Figure 7: Visualisation of post-pandemic CC-Sector innovation ecosystem with Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers pursuing an open innovation strategy with 
group 3 firms 
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Ultimately, group 3 Type 1 New Entrants need to decide whether they are more likely to 
maximise their earning potential as competitors to the Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturer 
by continuing to sell Enhanced CC-Products in the CC-Sector, or as a supplier of intangible 
goods and services, namely its cumulative portfolio of background CC-IP and novel CC-IP 
(sideground). 
 
3.2.4 Entry Strategy C ʹ Teaming Up 
 
By pursuing entry strategy C, Type 1 New Entrants repurpose their spare and complementary 
manufacturing resources and collaborate with Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers that are 
willing to share their CC-IP (background) (Tietze et al., 2020) in order to rapidly respond to 
the overwhelming surge in demand for CC-Products during the pandemic phase of the Covid-
19 induced crisis (López-Gómez et al., 2020). Type 1 New Entrants following this teaming-up 
approach can be characterised as either being firms with spare manufacturing capacity with 
related resources and capabilities, hereinafter denoted as group 1 Type 1 New Entrants, or 
tech giants possessing a diverse and rich set of capabilities that allows them to manufacture 
any product provided that access to the relevant IP is available, from now on referred to as 
group 2 Type 1 New Entrants (Tietze et al., 2020)13. As exemplified by our visualisation of 
post-pandemic CC-Sector innovation ecosystem in Figure 8, incumbent manufacturers in this 
scenario typically facilitate the upscaling effort by pragmatically granting access to its CC-IP 
(background) to group 1 and 2 Type 1 New Entrants willing to repurpose underutilised and 
related manufacturing capacities due to the urgency of meeting the rapidly increasing 
demand for CC-Products. During the pandemic phase, group 1 and 2 Type 1 New Entrants 
typically experience a rapid drop in demand for their non-CC-Products14, which they have 
been producing in large numbers during the pre-pandemic phase (Tietze et al., 2020). Joining 
the CC-Sector by teaming up with incumbent firms allows group 1 and 2 firms to retain some 
degree of utilisation of its workforce and facilities by manufacturing CC-Products, thereby at 
least partially covering fixed costs and bridging the demand gap during the Covid-19 induced 
crisis. However, the degree of complementarity between group 1 and Ϯ firms’ capabilities and 
CC-Product manufacturing requirements, as well as their skills gap relative to CC-Sector 
standards, must be within reasonable limits15 in order to allow group 1 and 2 firms to recover 
the cost of manufacturing repurposing (López-Gómez et al., 2020). 
 
13 An illustrative example for entry strategy C and group 1 and 2 Type 1 New Entrants teaming up with an 
Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturer is the partnership between General Motors (GM) (as Type 2 New Entrant) 
and Ventec Life Systems (Ventec) (as Incumbent), in which GE’s former’s Kokomo facility in Indiana, which is 
specialised in the production of precision electrical components for automobiles, was repurposed to rapidly 
scale manufacturing of the latter’s VOCSN critical care ventilator that was jointly developed by both companies 
for clinical use (Brooks and Flores, 2020).  
 
14 Non-CC-Sectors that are affected most by the Covid-19 induced crisis and who experienced a rapid drop in 
demand for non-CC-Products include commercial aerospace (Bruno, 2020), automotive (BusinessWire, 2020) 
and luxury (Girod, 2020). 
15 GM chose its Kokomo, Indiana, facility for manufacturing the VOCSN critical care ventilator because it was 
idled since the start of the Covid-19 induced crisis due to the massive drop in demand for cars, thus offering the 
capacity, and is specialised in manufacturing electrical components for cars and offers a clean room 
environment, thereby providing the complementary capabilities required by the CC-Sector (Boudette and 
Jacobs, 2020).  
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Figure 8: Visualisation of pandemic CC-Sector innovation ecosystem with group 1 (firms with spare manufacturing resources) and group 2 (tech giants) Type 1 New 
Entrants teaming-up with Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers 
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The entry strategy C scenario represents a win-win situation for all actors involved in the 
collaboration because Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers gain access to additional 
manufacturing capacity that helps responding to the positive demand shock for CC-Products 
and group 1 and 2 Type 1 New Entrants can bridge the demand gap for their non-CC-Products 
and utilise idle manufacturing capacities (while gaining some reputational benefits by 
contributing to ending the pandemic). In addition, the cross-licensing shown in Figure 8, 
allows group 1 and 2 Type 1 New Entrants to gain authorised access to CC-IP (background) 
underlying CC-Products developed and owned by incumbent firms, while also enabling group 
1 and 2 firms to diffuse their complementary background knowledge into the CC-Sector16. 
Ultimately, group 1 and 2 Type New Entrants and Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers face 
an IP assembly problem at the start of the collaboration (Granstrand and Holgersson, 2013), 
namely the challenge of integrating the necessary knowledge, technologies and skills, as well 
as the underlying formal and informal background IP through respective licensing 
agreements, in order to ensure the joint freedom-to-operate for effective scale-up of CC-
Product manufacturing. 
 
Before the collaboration effectively starts and Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers solve 
the IP assembly problem together with group 1 and 2 Type 1 New Entrants, the actors need 
to agree on the terms and conditions of the collaboration and capture these in the 
aforementioned agreements, such as a reciprocal cross-licensing contracts. As already 
described above incumbent firms in the entry strategy C scenario provide access to their CC-
IP (background) by offering some form of  licenses, probably for a limited term (Tietze et al., 
2020), and typically expect the same from group 1 and 2 firms with respect to their 
complementary background IP as shown in Figure 8. While the implementation of fair and 
reasonable royalties rather simplifies negotiations of licensing agreements in innovation 
ecosystems (Granstrand, Holgersson and Opedal, 2020), defining termination and scope-
restriction clauses is not as trivial due to the challenge of designing contractual mechanisms 
and limits ex-ante that anticipate the end of the pandemic phase and magnitude of CC-
Product demand during the Covid-19 crisis, respectively. Regarding the termination clause, 
defining a fixed term with options to extend the collaboration upon mutual agreement or 
linking the term to total sales figures for CC-Products are potential solutions17, whereas the 
latter may raise issues from a competition and antitrust law perspective (Nicholson Price II, 
Rai and Minssen, 2020). Regarding scope-restrictions, limiting usage of licensed IP to certain 
markets, products and customer groups could be an option as already highlighted in the entry 
strategy B scenario18. In the end, termination and scope-restriction clauses remain 
contentious subjects in cross-licensing negotiations because, on one hand, group 1 and 2 Type 
1 New Entrants are motivated to maximise both until the cost of repurposing spare 
 
16 In the example of the scaling up manufacturing of the VOCSN critical care ventilator, GM brings its global 
supplier base, vast logistics network, manufacturing, engineering, purchasing and legal prowess, all of which 
hold GM’s complementary formal and informal background IP, into the collaboration in order to meet the 
challenging goal to source the more than 700 individual parts according to Ventec’s specifications, which 
represents its CC-IP (background), necessary to assemble each of the planned two hundred thousand VOCSN 
ventilators (Brooks and Flores, 2020). 
17 This was raised by an NGT expert based upon several years of experience with negotiating licensing 
agreements with large OEMs in the commercial aerospace sector. 
18 Ventec, for instance, took an extreme stance towards scope-restriction and insisted on remaining the primary 
point of sale and distribution for VOCSN critical care ventilators manufactured through the collaboration with 
GM, despite its small size compared to its partner (Boudette and Jacobs, 2020). 
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manufacturing capacities is recovered, while, on the other hand, Incumbent CC-Product 
Manufacturers tend to be as restrictive as possible in order to curtail potential competition 
in the post-pandemic phase. This certainly calls for some involvement of experienced 
negotiators, who can act quick, agile to strike some potentially unconventional deal. 
 
As the term of the cross-licensing agreements and hence the collaboration is likely to be time 
limited (Tietze et al., 2020), Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers and group 1 and 2 Type 1 
New Entrants will analogously face an IP disassembly problem (Granstrand and Holgersson, 
2013), namely the challenge of disentangling jointly developed knowledge, technologies and 
skills, as well as the underlying formal and informal IP, through appropriate contingency 
clauses towards the end of the pandemic phase. More specifically, the transfer and 
recombination of CC-IP (background) owned by Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers and 
complementary background IP held by group 1 and 2 Type 1 New Entrants potentially leads 
to macro-level technological discontinuities and, ultimately, to really new innovations (Garcia 
and Calantone, 2002) and CC-Product enhancements, such as reduced manufacturing costs 
(Tietze et al., 2020), reduced lead-time or improved CC-Product quality enabled by new 
standardized best practices (Nicholson Price II, Rai and Minssen, 2020). These CC-Product 
enhancements could be captured either as CC-IP (foreground) if it is developed collaboratively 
by incumbents and group 1 and 2 firms, or as CC-IP (sideground) if it is developed by either 
actor individually outside of the collaboration (Granstrand and Holgersson, 2014). Discussed 
from the entry strategy B scenario, change-of-technology clauses represent an effective 
contractual mechanism for solving the IP disassembly problem (Granstrand and Holgersson, 
2013) by regulating the allocation of ownership and usage of both jointly developed CC-IP 
(foreground) and independently developed CC-IP (sideground) after cross-licensing 
agreements are terminated at the end of the pandemic phase. In the following two sub-
sections, two choices of change-of-technology clauses that were already discussed in the 
entry strategy B post-pandemic context are reconsidered in order to identify their respective 
effects on the pandemic CC-Sector innovation ecosystem in which group 1 and 2 Type 1 New 
Entrants team-up with Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers . These options are (i) grant-
back and (ii) assign-back clauses.  
 
3.2.4.1 Pandemic Change-of-Technology: Grant-back Clause 
 
If Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers and group 1 and 2 Type 1 New Entrants agree on a 
grant-back clause, ownership of newly developed CC-IP that is based on the CC-IP 
(background) of incumbents and/or complementary background IP of group 1 and 2 firms 
would remain with the innovator, but under the obligation of having to license it back to the 
collaboration partner (Granstrand and Holgersson, 2014). As shown in our visualisation of the 
pandemic CC-Sector innovation ecosystem governed by a grant-back clause in Figure 9, any 
CC-IP (foreground) that is jointly developed by Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers and 
group 1 and 2 Type 1 New Entrants on the basis of the former’s CC-IP (background) and the 
latter’s complementary background IP is jointly owned. Furthermore shown in Figure 9, any 
CC-IP (sideground) that is independently developed by group 1 and 2 Type 1 New Entrants on 
the basis of both their complementary background IP and incumbents’ CC-IP (background) 
remains in the ownership of group 1 and 2 firms under the explicit contractual condition that 
a license to such CC-IP (sideground) is granted to incumbent firms under the general terms 
and conditions of the cross-licensing agreement. 
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Figure 9: Visualisation of pandemic CC-Sector innovation ecosystem with group 1 and 2 Type 1 New Entrants and Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers agreeing on 
a grant-back clause 
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Agreeing on a grant back clause ultimately allows the collaboration partners to hold on to 
ownership of the IP underlying their respective endogenously or collaboratively developed 
innovation, as the case may be, while at the same time conserving the reciprocal authorised 
access to background and novel CC-IP, hence the freedom-to-operate, that is necessary for 
both collaboration partners to supply jointly enhanced CC-Products to all customer groups. 
 
3.2.4.2 Pandemic Change-of-Technology: Assign-back Clause 
 
If Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers and group 1 and 2 Type 1 New Entrants agree on an 
assign-back clause, ownership of newly developed CC-IP is transferred back from the 
innovator to the collaboration partner owning the respective CC-IP (background) or 
complementary background IP on whose basis the newly developed CC-IP is based 
(Granstrand and Holgersson, 2014). Our visualisation of the pandemic CC-Sector innovation 
ecosystem in Figure 10 shows the IP-related dynamics induced by the assign-back clause, 
namely full ownership of CC-IP (sideground) and joint ownership of CC-IP (foreground) is fully 
transferred by group 1 and 2 Type 1 New Entrants to Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturer, 
while the former retains the right to license back the newly developed CC-IP under the terms 
of the cross-licensing agreement. While newly developed CC-IP that is based on both CC-IP 
(background) and complementary background IP is generally eligible to shared ownership by 
both incumbent and group 1 and 2 firms, Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers might want 
to claim exclusive ownership of any newly developed CC-IP by new entrants because they 
consider it to be of core importance to its activities in the CC-Sector and consider it non-core 
to group 1 and 2 Type 1 New Entrants in the pandemic phase. The assign-back clause thus 
effectively leads to an automatic transfer of ownership of both CC-IP (foreground), which is 
jointly developed by incumbent and group 1 and 2 firms, and CC-IP (sideground), which is 
individually developed by group 1 and 2 firms, to the Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers 
regardless of whether it was developed on the basis of CC-IP (background) alone or both CC-
IP (background) and complementary background IP. Figure 10 below also shows that despite 
having to transfer ownership of all newly developed CC-IP back to the incumbent firm, the 
licensing back of CC-IP (foreground) and CC-IP (sideground) by incumbent firms conserves 
group 1 and Ϯ firms’ full freedom-to-operate for the continued manufacturing and 
distribution of enhanced CC-Products to all customer groups during the pandemic phase. 
 
As long as the cross-licensing agreement is effective during the pandemic phase, it makes 
little difference to either collaboration partner whether ownership of newly developed IP is 
governed by a grant-back or an assign-back clause because back licensing terms and 
conditions ensure that both group 1 and 2 Type 1 New Entrants and Incumbent CC-Product 
Manufacturers have freedom-to-operate, thus to manufacture and sell the jointly developed 
CC-Products to all customer groups as discussed above and shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10. 
Only as the pandemic terminates and demand for jointly developed CC-Products declines 
towards pre-pandemic levels, the termination clause agreed upon by the collaboration 
partners takes effect and ends the cross-licensing agreement. Group 1 and 2 and incumbent 
firms then need to decide whether to continue the collaboration and agree on post-pandemic 
(cross-) licensing terms and conditions or whether to end the collaboration. At this point the 
consequences of the choice between the two change-of-technology options become 
important.  
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Figure 10: Visualisation of pandemic CC-Sector innovation ecosystem with group 1 and 2 Type 1 New Entrants and Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers agreeing 
on an assign-back clause 
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In the following, we consider one post-pandemic CC-Sector innovation ecosystem in which 
the collaboration is terminated and another in which the collaboration is renewed in order to 
delineate the consequences of the change-of-technology option chosen at the start of the 
pandemic phase for each collaboration partner. 
 
3.2.4.3 Post-pandemic response option (3) ʹ Rivalrous Perspective: Incumbents ending 
collaboration 
 
As the pandemic phase ends, demand for CC-Products is likely to decrease to pre-pandemic 
levels, but contractual mechanisms defined in the termination clause of the cross-licensing 
agreement may stipulate a continuation beyond the end of the Covid-19 induced crisis. In 
order to defend their pre-pandemic market share and level of sales in this contracting CC-
Sector, Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers may choose to adopt a rivalrous perspective on 
competitive dynamics (Chen and Miller, 2015) similarly to the post-pandemic response option 
(1) in the entry strategy B scenario. This means that incumbent firms stop viewing group 1 
and 2 Type 1 New Entrants as collaboration partners, but as competition instead that needs 
to be effectively forced out of the CC-Sector in the post-pandemic phase19. The obvious choice 
for incumbent firms therefore is to end the collaboration by expediting the termination 
clause, which is herein referred to the post-pandemic response option (3). From Figure 11, 
we can see that the end of the collaboration and hence the termination of the cross-licensing 
terms and conditions at the start of post-pandemic phase mean that established links for 
authorised IP access between former collaboration partners are undone. More specifically, as 
depicted in Figure 11, if IP ownership and usage during the pandemic phase was governed by 
a grant-back clause, the end of the licensing arrangement leads to group 1 and 2 Type 1 New 
Entrants losing authorised access to incumbent firms’ CC-IP (background) and Incumbent CC-
Product Manufacturers having to forfeit authorised access to group 1 and 2 firms’ 
complementary background IP and CC-IP (sideground). Furthermore, co-ownership of jointly 
developed CC-IP (foreground) is conserved. Ultimately, both group 1 and 2 Type 1 New 
Entrants and Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers lose their respective previously held 
freedom-to-operate with respect to manufacturing jointly Enhanced CC-Products. While 
incumbent firms potentially need to return to manufacturing and selling the original, pre-
pandemic version of the CC-Product but potentially with selected enhanced features, 
depending on which features of the jointly developed Enhanced CC-Product are embedded in 
jointly owned CC-IP (foreground), group 1 and 2 Type 1 New Entrants have to stop 
manufacturing and selling jointly enhanced CC-Products altogether. 
 
If IP ownership and usage during the pandemic phase was governed by an assign-back 
clause, our respective visualisation of the post-pandemic CC-Sector innovation ecosystem in  
Figure 12 shows that the end of the cross-licensing arrangement leads to group 1 and 2 Type 
1 New Entrants basically losing authorised access to any CC-IP namely CC-IP (background) 
owned by incumbent firms, jointly developed CC-IP (foreground), and even endogenously 
developed CC-IP (sideground). 
 
19 Group 1 and 2 Type 1 New Entrants’ interests in the post-pandemic phase may be aligned because their origin 
non-CC-Sector recovers and demand for their non-CC-Products, which they have been producing in large 
numbers prior to the Covid-19 induced crisis, increases. In addition, group 1 and 2 firms may have succeeded in 
recovering their investment in repurposing their complementary manufacturing capacities during the pandemic 
phase. 
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Figure 11: Visualisation of post-pandemic CC-Sector innovation ecosystem with incumbent firms ending cross-licensing agreements governed by a grant-back change-
of-technology clause  
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Figure 12: Visualisation of post-pandemic CC-Sector innovation ecosystem with incumbent firms ending cross-licensing agreements governed by an assign-back 
change-of-technology clause 
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Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers, on the other hand, only forfeit authorised access to 
complementary background IP owned by group 1 and 2 firms. Ultimately, group 1 and 2 Type 
1 New Entrants again lose their freedom-to-operate necessary to continue manufacturing 
jointly enhanced CC-Products, while incumbent firms would potentially be able to continue 
manufacturing and selling CC-Products with enhanced features resulting from joint 
developments during the collaboration depending on which features are captured by back-
assigned CC-IP (sideground) and CC-IP (foreground). 
 
Asserting an assign-back clause in the cross-licensing agreement during the pandemic phase 
might appear to be strategically advantageous from the perspective of the Incumbent CC-
Product Manufacturer because it maximises the potential freedom-to-operate and allows 
the continuation of exclusive enhanced CC-Product manufacturing by the incumbent firm in 
the post-pandemic phase20. Furthermore, an assign-back clause avoids the co-ownership of 
jointly developed CC-IP (foreground) resulting from the grant-back clause as exemplified by 
the respective CC-Sector innovation ecosystem in  
Figure 12, thus mitigating risks associated with limited control over collaboration partners’ 
usage of such novel CC-IP (Granstrand and Holgersson, 2014). For example, there is a viable 
risk that a group 1 and 2 Type 1 New Entrant may license jointly owned CC-IP (foreground) to 
other incumbent firms in the CC-Sector in an effort to continue monetising its non-core IP 
portfolio, which cannot be in the interest of its former collaboration partner. From the 
perspective of group 1 and 2 Type 1 New entrants, agreeing on a grant-back clause during the 
pandemic phase appears more beneficial as it allows group 1 and 2 firms to appropriate 
further value from its collaboration with Incumbent CC-Product manufacturers during the 
pandemic phase. More specifically, as exclusively owned CC-IP (sideground) and jointly 
owned CC-IP (foreground) would typically capture technologies of non-core importance to 
group 1 and Ϯ firms’ activities in the non-CC-Sector, continued monetisation through sub-
licensing to other incumbent firms may be a viable option. Alternatively, transfer of the novel 
CC-IP into the non-CC-Sector could be conducted if the technology is deemed complementary 
to group 1 and Ϯ firms’ core activities. 
 
3.2.4.4 Post-pandemic response option (4) ʹ Relational Perspective: Continuation of 
Collaboration 
 
As an alternative to the response option 3, incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers can adopt 
a relational approach to managing the post-pandemic phase in the CC-Sector and view group 
1 and 2 Type 1 New Entrants as a sustainable source of further innovation resulting from the 
recombination of complementary background IP, CC-IP (background) and novel CC-IP 
developed during the pandemic phase. Similarly to the post-pandemic response option (2) in 
the context of the entry strategy B scenario, this perspective leads incumbent firms to 
continuing or renewing the collaboration with group 1 and 2 firms in the post-pandemic 
phase, which is hereinafter denoted as the post-pandemic response option (4)21. The licensing 
 
20 In the context of the collaboration example of GM and Ventec quoted earlier, an assign-back clause could 
potentially enable the latter to continuously benefit from the collaboration, for instance, by adopting newly 
devised VOCSN production and assembly processes implemented by GM in its repurposed Kokoma facility. 
21 While the actors’ motivation to collaborate during the pandemic phase was primarily driven by the urgent call 
to respond to a crisis situation with a strict focus on covering costs as shown in the GM and Ventec example 
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terms governing authorised usage of background and novel CC-IP during the pandemic phase 
are, however, likely to be succeeded by different agreements, such as containing elevated 
royalty fees in exchange for authorised CC-IP usage in the post-pandemic phase (Tietze et al., 
2020). Furthermore, Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers and group 1 and 2 Type 1 New 
Entrants will need to engage into an IP reassembly process, which is the recurring cycle of 
sequentially solving the IP disassembly and assembly problem between two temporally 
distinct collaboration projects (Granstrand and Holgersson, 2014), when transitioning from 
the ad hoc developed collaboration during the pandemic to the post-pandemic collaboration, 
during which the objectives of collaboration partners are likely to be different. 
 
Our visualisation of the post-pandemic CC-Sector innovation ecosystem in Figure 13 shows 
the IP-related dynamics stimulated by a grant-back change-of-technology clause during the 
IP reassembly process at the start of the post-pandemic phase. Both collaboration partners 
start accumulating portfolios of background CC-IP. More specifically, group 1 and 2 Type 1 
New Entrants integrate CC-IP (foreground) and CC-IP (sideground) with its complementary 
background IP to form its cumulative portfolio of background CC-IP, which becomes subject 
to royalty-based licensing terms and conditions to Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers. 
Conversely, Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers consider the jointly owned CC-IP 
(foreground) to become part of its cumulative portfolio of background CC-IP, to which it offers 
authorised access under royalty-based licensing terms and conditions to group 1 and 2 firms. 
The post-pandemic CC-Sector innovation ecosystem map in Figure 13 also highlights the 
restricted freedom-to-operate that may result from scope-restriction clauses, on which the 
continuing collaboration partners may agree. 
 
If collaboration partners agreed on an assign-back clause during the pandemic phase, the IP-
related dynamics during the IP reassembly process at the start of the post-pandemic phase 
would differ considerably as shown in our depiction of the respective post-pandemic CC-
Sector innovation ecosystem in Figure 14. More specifically, group 1 and Ϯ firms’ cumulative 
portfolio of background CC-IP would only consist of its complementary background IP from 
before the pandemic. Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers, on the other hand, would amass 
a background CC-IP portfolio consisting of its endogenously developed CC-IP (background), 
jointly developed CC-IP (foreground) and exogenously developed CC-IP (sideground). From 
observing Figure 14, it becomes evident that an assign-back clause agreed in the pandemic 
phase effectively leads to unevenly distributed background CC-IP portfolios in the post-
pandemic CC-Sector innovation ecosystem. But nevertheless, a royalty-based cross-licensing 
arrangement would conserve sufficient freedom-to-operate allowing both collaboration 
partners to continue to manufacture and sell jointly developed CC-Products. 
 
From the perspective of Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers, asserting an assign-back 
clause in the cross-licensing agreement during the pandemic phase is again more beneficial 
than a grant-back clause primarily because it enables incumbent firms to quickly accumulate 
a sizeable and exclusively owned background CC-IP portfolio22.
 
(Boudette and Jacobs, 2020), competitive considerations with a focus on longer term value creation and win-
win exchanges (Chen and Miller, 2015) become dominant in a post-pandemic setting. 
22 Furthermore, the cost and burden of research and development that formed the basis of jointly developed 
CC-Product enhancements was shared with group 1 and 2 Type 1 New Entrants during the pandemic phase. 
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Figure 13: Visualisation of post-pandemic CC-Sector innovation ecosystem with incumbent and group 1 and 2 firms continuing cross-licensing agreements on the 
basis of a grant-back change-of-technology clause during the pandemic phase  
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Figure 14: Visualisation of post-pandemic CC-Sector innovation ecosystem with incumbent and group 1 and 2 firms continuing cross-licensing agreements on the 
basis of a grant-back change-of-technology clause during the pandemic phase 
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The larger background CC-IP portfolio, in turn, allows incumbent firms to build bargaining 
power in subsequent cross-licensing negotiations with group 1 and 2 firms, particularly when 
asserting favourable scope-restriction clauses and royalty fees for the post-pandemic phase. 
As already discussed in the context of the post-pandemic response option (2) of the entry 
strategy B scenario, however, building and using this bargaining power can become a double-
edged sword because it may irritate group 1 and 2 Type 1 New Entrants and stimulate them 
to disengage from negotiations of a post-pandemic licensing agreement, thus voluntarily 
exiting the CC-Sector innovation ecosystem. Ultimately, if incumbent firms intend to continue 
the collaboration with group 1 and 2 firms in the post-pandemic phase, they may need to 
incentivise their former and hopefully continuing collaboration partner to remain in the CC-
Sector by creating a win-win situation either through less restrictive scope-restriction clauses 
or preferential royalty fees for authorised access to its background CC-IP portfolio. 
 
Thus, maintaining a grant-back clause in the cross-licensing agreement during the pandemic 
phase appears the more advantageous strategic choice for group 1 and 2 Type 1 New Entrants 
because it enables them to hold on to a considerable background CC-IP portfolio. This, in turn, 
may even be necessary for group 1 and 2 firms in order to recoup the investment in 
repurposing its complementary manufacturing capacities at the start of the pandemic phase 
by continued monetisation of its background CC-IP portfolio in the post-pandemic phase. 
More importantly, however, the grant-back clause and resulting background CC-IP portfolio 
may create a more level playing field for the cross-licensing negotiations with Incumbent CC-
Product Manufacturers. On the other hand, group 1 and Ϯ firms’ motivation to monetise its 
background CC-IP portfolio combined with the aforementioned ambiguity around jointly 
owned CC-IP (foreground) resulting from the grant-back clause during the pandemic phase, 
may attract the scrutiny of incumbent firms, particularly if group 1 and 2 firms offer access to 
jointly developed CC-IP (foreground) to incumbents’ competitors in the post-pandemic CC-
Sector innovation ecosystem23. 
 
4.0 Conclusions, Limitations and Future Research 
 
The goal of this study is to help further the understanding of IP related dynamics, risks and 
uncertainties in the CC-Sector as the Covid-19 induced crisis unfolds and new entrants are 
called into or voluntarily join incumbents in the CC-sector to help out in the effort to mitigate 
the crisis situation. We accomplished this by taking an innovation ecosystem perspective and 
adapting, as well as extending a previously developed standardised visual approach, namely 
the SVEL proposed by Moerchel et al. (2021), to map the CC-Sector for each of Tietze et al.’s 
(2020) three proposed entry strategies, namely (A) insouciantly adopting, (B) designing from 
scratch and (C) teaming up. 
 
The results indicate that the threat of Type 1 New Entrants permanently establishing 
themselves as competing actors in the CC-Sector is particularly high in the entry strategy (B) 
scenario and exists to some extent also in entry strategy (C). In any case, following a defensive 
counter strategy by filing an infringement claim against Type 1 New Entrants, thus enforcing 
 
23 Granstrand and Holgersson (2014) document a case, in which a collaboration partner sued its counterpart for 
breaching post-contractual loyalty, infringing its patents and misappropriating its trade secrets after being 
denied to search for an alternative (3rd party) collaboration partner by showing jointly developed facilities. 
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an injunction and seeking compensation, exposes Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers to 
the risk of high litigation costs not being recouped or even failing altogether. Furthermore, 
this defensive approach typically implicates that incumbent firms’ access to potentially 
valuable complementary background IP and newly developed CC-IP owned by Type 1 New 
Entrants is denied permanently, thus blocking the way to CC-Product innovations. On the 
other hand, when pursuing a collaborative approach, incumbent firms might consider to 
assert assign-back clauses in cross-licensing agreements in order to quickly accumulate a 
sizeable portfolio of CC-IP (background) while sharing the cost of its development, to avoid 
risks of shared CC-IP ownership, and to build up leverage for the next round of cross-licensing 
negotiations. 
 
The study also shows that Type 1 New Entrants typically make considerable investments to 
enter the CC-Sector in order to help in the effort to meet the positive demand shock for CC-
Products at the start of the pandemic. In order to recover these costs, new entrant firms 
ought to conduct a freedom-to-operate analysis as early as possible, particularly when 
following entry strategies (A) and (B), in order to mitigate the risk of infringement claims by 
incumbent firms pursuing a defensive counter strategy. Furthermore, when entering into 
cross-licensing agreements with Incumbent CC-Product Manufacturers, particularly in entry 
strategies (B) and (C), it would be prudent for Type 1 New Entrants to insist on a grant-back 
clause because it would allow them to retain ownership of their endogenously and newly 
developed CC-IP that potentially underlie valuable CC-Product enhancements that are 
desirable to incumbent firms. This, in turn, leaves new entrant firms enough leverage over 
incumbent firms to potentially negotiate lower royalties and less confining scope restriction 
clauses during the next round of cross-licensing negotiations. 
 
This study comprises several contributions. We contribute theoretically to the IP 
management literature by offering a definition for a new IP-type that is relevant for the open 
innovation context, namely paraground IP. It is herein defined as IP that underlies innovations 
which are independently developed by an actor outside of a collaboration context on the 
basis of another (3rd party) actor’s IP without authorised access or having established 
freedom-to-operate. Furthermore, we add methodologically by further enhancing and 
broadening the SVEL’s scope of application to capturing IP dynamics in evolving innovation 
ecosystems. Finally, this study comprises managerial implications for decision makers and 
negotiators who represent incumbent and new entrant firms in CC-sectors as the crisis 
situation evolves. 
 
The nature of the research methodology and the scarcity of publicly available data, however, 
add some limitations to our approach and resulting findings. As the future evolution of the 
Covid-19 pandemic and the resulting crisis-situation were unknown at the time this study was 
conducted, most of the managerial implications are based on consensus-reaching 
extrapolations from current events by subject matter experts. Nevertheless, we believe that 
our conclusions merit being empirically confirmed once the Covid-19 pandemic terminates 
and empirical data covering its entire evolution from onset to termination will be available. 
Finally, as the study is focused on the Covid-19 pandemic, the generalisability of our findings 
to other crisis situations remains to be tested. Future studies might want to apply the 
enhanced SVEL to other crisis settings, such as health or economic crises in order to either 
proof its versatility or to enhance and develop it further.  
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